Abstract. The representation problem, which plays a crucial role in the study of cognition, is discussed from a holistic perspective. Based on some distinctions a concept of duality is introduced, which can be applied to two aspects involved in the representation problem, namely meaning and computation.
INTRODUCTION
In the study of cognition, the notion of mental representations plays a crucial role. No matter whether mental representations are taken as a useful concept or not, every approach to cognition has to clarify its position in this point. Yet, it is hard to give a general definition of the problem. In section 2 we try to introduce the idea of mental representations by the use of a two aspect scheme, which also serves as a basis for a rough overview of the most important positions. Starting with section 3 we try to propose an alternative account on the problem by suggesting a holistic world view in the form of what we call space-time unity. The characteristics of this approach is that the usual way to explain the whole in terms of interacting (pre-existing) parts is reversed -the parts are treated as products of necessarily incomplete cuts or distinctions. Among the distinctions that we need to formulate and dissolve the problem of mental representations are the distinction between space and time, the distinction between continuity and discontinuity and the distinction between inside and outside observation. Based on these distinctions we introduce a duality relation between spatial and temporal structure in section 4. The key argument for our approach to the representation question, namely a specific kind of relation between part and whole, is introduced in section 5. In section 6 we use our conceptions to shed some new light on the notions system, self-organization and emergence, which play an important part in cognitive theorizing. In the sections 7 and 8 we introduce our cognitive scenario, make our approach to the representation problem explicit and try to extract some elements of the spatio-temporal processes involved.
TWO ASPECTS OF THE REPRESENTATION PROBLEM
The basic idea standing behind the assumption of mental representations can be introduced by the use of a twoaspect scheme.
Representations are identifiable states of a cognitive system that
• refer to states of the system´s environment, and
• are processed by the cognitive system.
These two aspects of representations fit quite well into the dominating paradigm in cognitive modeling, namely information-processing or computation.
For the classical symbolic approach to cognition (now called GOFAI -"good old fashioned artificial intelligence") the coverage of the computational aspect of cognition forms the center of interest. The starting point is language, where the relations between concepts and environmental states in the first place are taken to be simply given. Connectionism, GOFAI´s counterpart in the so-called symbol wars, focuses on perception and therefore on the relation between the cognitive system and the environment. The main topics are learning (self-organization) and associative processes.
The obviously unsolvable tension between the two approaches forms only a part of what can be understood by the representation problem. While symbolic computation and most of connectionism still agree in the usefulness of mental representations, there is strong critique on the representational view of cognition in general.
For radical constructivism (1) there is no simple relation between states of the cognitive system and states of the environment (especially no mapping from the latter to the former). A cognitive system is informationally closed and refers only to itself, thus the first aspect is completely denied. Another example is given by Rodney Brook´s work on autonomous agents. In (2) he argues for the necessity to embody intelligence and to situate it in a real world. The usefulness of a representational level of description of the processes in the agent is rejected. From our two-aspect scheme this looks like a stress of the first aspect and a critique of the second.
Another dimension of the representation problem is mostly ignored, namely the question for whom there is a relation between representations and the environment of the cognitive system. If we want this relation to be more than an outside observer´s matter (e.g. held by the designer of an AI computer program), we have to go beyond the computational paradigm. As John Searle illustrated in his famous Chinese Room example (3), computation as being merely syntactical can in no way explain the (subjective) fact that our mental states mean something to us. For a computer program it is completely irrelevant, whether some bit-combination refers to an apple or a car -in either way processing is the same.
The holistic approach being outlined in the following section aims at making this frustrating situation in the discussion of the problem of mental representation understandable. The two aspects of the problem which we used to introduce the most important views will reappear as two sides of a duality relation derivable from our approach.
SPACE-TIME UNITY
The starting point for our approach is the assumption that the universe has to be understood as one spatiotemporal whole. What we usually regard as objects existing by their own right are inseparable parts that we -as cognitive agents -cut out by making distinctions and by drawing borders. Every analysis of the whole in terms of fully describable parts is necessarily incomplete. (So far, we are in good accordance with David Bohm´s holism (4) .)
This does not imply that no qualitative investigation is possible or that views are necessarily arbitrary. As long as we are aware of the fundamental incompleteness, i.e. as long as we do not raise ontological claims for the things we cut out of the whole, we can make progress and increase our understanding. We can no longer believe in a right or complete theory made up of extracted concepts and laws that relate them to each other. The process of understanding includes not only the formulation and improvement of theories, but also the resolution of the concepts in favor of different concepts drawn from different views.
In the following we will introduce some distinctions that will form the basis for our approach to the representation problem. We do not only make these distinctions, but indicate what there necessary limitations are and how they have to be resolved, again.
Space and Time
The distinction between space and time is most common to us. There are different reasons why it is so hard to accept that this distinction is artificial, the main reason being the difference in our movements through space and through time. Yet, according to Einstein´s Theory of Relativity space and time form a continuum. Changing our movement in space affects our movement in time. In our everyday life and in almost all scientific theorizing dealing with space and the time this unity seems irrelevant.
For computation and consequently for cognitive science the distinction is unquestioned. On one hand there are information, data and representations that can be treated as spatial entities, on the other hand there are processes and algorithms that can be treated as temporal entities. It is clear that both domains are highly interrelated, but the basical conclusion is avoided. Arguing for an inseparable unity of information and processing is easy and can be done within the domain of computation itself. There is not just one way for a programmer to model a problem of information processing. Different views of one-and-the-same problem result in models with different amounts of information and processing. We should not ask: "How much information (or processing) is required to solve the task?", but "How much information-processing do we need?".
As an example, think of the task of storing images. We can store pixels with a high cost of information space and little cost of processing. Or we can store graphical objects (like circles or rectangles) that have to be extracted from and re-transformed into pixels. The amount of processing will be higher and the amount of information will be lower.
There is no right information and no right processing in a similar way as there is no right spatial and no right temporal extension of a physical process.
Continuity and Discontinuity
We talk about continuity along one dimension of a description when the following holds in a rough sense for entities A, B and C:
The relation between A and B is the same as between B and C. Thus, knowing A and its relation to B means to know about C and possibly a longer sequence of entities.
While continuity forms the basis for the recognition of relations between entities, discontinuity may lead us to make distinctions and to draw borders, it is thus a precondition for the concept of an object.
Let us apply this to the physics of space and time. Space and time in Special Relativity are merely continuous -the existence of the object is taken for granted and it is independent of the geometry of space and time. In General Relativity discontinuity enters the game -movements are accelerated and objects are introduced as contractions (i.e. discontinuities) of the space-time geometry itself.
Continuity and discontinuity come together again when we talk about structure. For simple systems we could define structure as a measure for the number of objects and relations (e.g. nodes and links in a semantic network). More interesting systems do not allow a clear separation of objects and relations (e.g. chaotic dynamics), yet we still can measure structure (e.g. in terms of fractal dimensions). A qualitative concept of structure becomes meaningless when there is no continuity (e.g. folk use of the term chaos) as well as when there is no discontinuity (complete order). Structure should thus be understood rather as a product of continuous and discontinuous elements than as a sum. In this sense, there is a strong link to the discussion of the term complexity (see e.g. (5)).
Levels of Description
The necessity for a distinction between levels of description can be illustrated using the distinction between continuity and discontinuity. What appears as discontinuity on a lower level of description may be described as a continuous sequence of discontinuities on a more abstracted level. An object can be seen as a discontinuity in spaceyet there can be a continuous arrangement of objects in space. An event can be seen as a discontinuity in time -yet there can be a continuous sequence of events.
Of course, there is no right level of description. Like the drawing of borders the level of description always depends on the observer´s choice.
Non-locality and Locality
The distinction between non-locality and locality is an abstraction of the distinction between continuity and discontinuity. The ideal object has a location in space and is unaffected by its environment. Beside its spatial discontinuity the object is extended in time, where it stays identical for longer periods. Its existence in time is not bound to a short interval like it is the case for its spatial existence. In this sense we call objects non-local in time. When reversing the situation we get wave phenomena that are non-local in space, but local in time. The ideal wave is identical for all (spatial) points in a medium. On the time axis there is discontinuity, the wave´s rushing through a point in space appears as an event that does not allow conclusions about prior or later states of the spatial point. Like the objects marks a point in space, the wave marks a point in time.
Before we generalize the idea expressed by these examples to a duality relation between particle and wave aspects, we have to make yet another distinction.
Inside and Outside Observation
When talking about meaning and consciousness dealing with inside observation becomes almost inescapable. But the need for a distinction between inside and outside observation is not only felt in cognitive science (see, e.g. (6)).
What makes it so hard to formulate concepts of inside observation is the very nature of hard science which is clearly outside. The different approaches to the problem can hardly be brought together and it is not our goal here to give a full account. Yet, what can be done on the basis of the notions introduced so far is to formulate three points of concern:
• Outside observation can only be understood as a construction and therefore as secondary. The ideal outside observer is separated from what is being observed -according to our basic assumption of inseparability there is a fundamental incompleteness.
• The inside observer cannot be separated from what is being observed. Observer and observed form a unity. Inside observation is primary, the question is rather how an inside observer may construct an outside position than how inside observation can be explained by outside conceptions.
• Outside observation must be associated with discontinuity (and locality) and inside observation with continuity (and non-locality). For the outside observer, phenomena are local and external, whereas the phenomena of inside observation are brought forth by the inseparable unity of observer and observed. Therefore they are non-local phenomena.
The distinction between the two types of observation will help us to introduce our cognitive scenario and to explain how a representation can mean something to the cognitive system.
THE DUALITY RELATION
The basic assumption from which we derived the duality relation in more detail in (7) is the following:
Continuity (non-locality) along one dimension is always correlated with discontinuity (locality) along other dimensions.
(1)
Only when discontinuity concentrates on an observer´s spatial axes, the observer can talk of an object or particle. In the same way there has to be a concentration of discontinuity along the time axis that makes a description as a wave useful. For us, both combinations are necessarily incomplete -there is continuity and discontinuity on all levels of description in space and time. There is no right partitioning of space possible that leaves time merely continuous, though we achieved good result using this view. More obviously, there is also no right partitioning of time possible that leaves space continuous. In the following, we will talk about a duality between particle and wave aspects that correspond with the pairs (discontinuity in space, continuity in time) and (continuity in space, discontinuity in time).
The (old style) scientific world view exemplified by Laplace´s demon appears as the belief in the sufficiency of the particle aspect: If a demon knew the positions and velocities of all particles of the universe at some point in time, he could calculate every state of the universe at any time! From this viewpoint time is a purely continuous dimension -there should be a right level of description that makes the passage of time a transformation that does neither bring anything new nor looses anything.
The wave aspect is mostly ignored, but turns out to be a fruitful complement once we accepted the incompleteness of the classical side of the duality. We could think of a dual demon knowing the dynamics of the complete past and future occurring in one point in space. Could this demon tell us anything about the dynamics of all the other points in space? We will return to this question in section 5.
Before, let us give some more examples for what can be regarded as dualities in our sense. In science, there is a very general duality between hard and soft sciences: Hard science has to define its concepts (in some description space). It is aiming at forcing arguments and precise predictions -soft science is always context-sensitive (that means, concepts are more associative and thus cannot be localized). Soft science brings together things that seem to be "very far away" from each other. Consequently, soft science is less successful in making predictions.
Our introduction to the representation problem already made use of the duality between the two aspects of mental representations. The relational aspect between a cognitive system and its environment is in the last consequence incompatible with the computational aspect. Continuity in space and continuity in time cannot be fully present simultaneously. If a representation is to be processed merely by its local properties, it cannot mean something which requires non-locality in space. The two aspects belong to different description schemes.
In (7) we also argued for a duality between two basic types of conscious experience. For the case of inside observation it is important to understand the relation between continuity (as seen from an outside observer) and what is experienced as identity by the inside observer. The spatial self depends on borders (discontinuity in space) and determinism (continuity in time). In this state we, as inside observers, are identical through time, because time is the continuous dimension. We loose this experienced quality when a) our borders are destroyed, or when b) the causality of the chain of events breaks down (e.g. when we are shocked). The spatial self has a location in spacenamely in the HERE, it makes a distinction between me and the world. The temporal self on the other hand makes a distinction between experiences and therefore between points in time. The temporal self is located in time -namely in the NOW. By giving up the spatial closure, that is -by interacting -we become integrative parts of the world. The experienced quality of this kind of self is the feeling of identity with the world, because in this case, space is the continuous dimension.
PART AND WHOLE
The representation problem is usually discussed as the question how one entity or part, namely the cognitive system, contains or reflects other entities or parts, namely outside objects. As can already be read from our approach elaborated so far, our cognitive scenario is different. For us, the cognitive system has to be viewed as an inside observer which means that it cannot be understood as a separate entity. The cognitive system and its environment have to be regarded as a unity, which -as a whole -produces non-local phenomena. Before we go into this cognitive scenario in more detail and thereby make our approach to the representation problem explicit, we would like to give a general account on the relation between part and whole in a spatio-temporal unity.
Dynamical systems theory provides us with an idea of a spatio-temporal whole that suffices for our purpose. One restriction that has to be made is that we are not interested in dynamical systems that come to a halt. Our argument takes the temporality as essential. Fixed point attractor systems like most neural networks loose their temporal structure when having reached the attractor.
We can introduce the idea now with a simple example. Figure 1a shows a dynamical system consisting of two binary units A and B interacting with each other. If unit A receives 1 (0) as input from unit B, its next output will be 1 (0). The same holds for unit B. With differing initial values for A and B the whole system will oscillate between 1 and 0 with at each point in time differing states in A and B (Fig. 1b) . A description of the system´s behavior in state space shows two points, namely one for the system´s state 1/0 (unit A in state 1, unit B in state 0) and one for the system´s state 0/1 (Fig. 1c) . This is a mapping of the whole system´s state at single points in time. We have yet another description -we can map the state evolution for unit A alone. In our example we do this in a twodimensional coordinate system with A´s state at time t as x-axis and A´s state at time t+1 as y-axis (Fig. 1d) . Again, we have two points as a result. The point 1/0 means now that when unit A is in the state 1 at time t, it will be in the state 0 at time t+1, the analogue for the point 0/1.
What do we learn from this example? There are basically two descriptions of the system´s spatio-temporal behavior, both yielding equivalent structures. The temporal description of a part of the system shows the same structure as the spatial description of the whole system at single points in time. This is, simplified and in short, the basic idea of Takens´s theorem of embedding (8) . It is important to note that the description still works for much more complicated systems, including systems that produce behavior of infinite complexity like chaotic dynamics. The extraction of typical time sequences of only one observable of a chaotic system -without any other knowledge of the system -allows to make quite good predictions of the short-term time evolution of this observable (9) .
The time evolutions of the variables of a dynamical system may look quite different, but they share the same dynamical structure. The degree to which this statement is true depends on how much interaction there is between what we take as parts. When there is little or no interaction, the time evolution of the part will not reflect the structure of the whole. In this case we are more inclined to call our parts individual entities holding their own local causality, but less inclined to call the collection of parts a system. (more on the notion of a system in section 6). The presence of the temporal structure of a whole system in its parts can be regarded as the wave aspect. What is essential for the wave is the dynamics and the dynamics -however complicated it may be -is contained everywhere in space. The particle aspect can be observed when a part depends more on itself than on its environment. It will develop its own local causality and a certain independence from the environment. By this, it will loose the containment of the dynamical structure of the whole.
Only the particle aspect allows us to describe the whole as interacting individual objects. What constitutes the whole as a coherent unity is the wave aspect. The whole, of course, is more than the sum of its parts -what is left in the reductionist picture is the wave aspect.
Let us now return to the idea of the dual demon from section 4. The theorem of embedding illustrateded by our example gives us a perfect basis for a temporal demon. The temporal structure of a whole system is in principle contained in each part -knowing the full dynamics of a single point would mean to know the dynamics of the whole system. The infinity of the structure makes every description incomplete, both the spatial and the temporal demon cannot know everything, but have a quite good grasp of the whole.
SELF-ORGANIZATION AND SYSTEMS
One ingredient of the theory of self-organization is the part-whole relation on which we just gave an account by applying the duality between wave and particle aspects. In addition, we would like to propose a geometrical metaphor for what is described by the theory of self-organization.
This metaphor consists in a rotating axis of continuity in space-time. In the direction that is normal to this axis discontinuity dominates (this reflects our assumption (1) on the link between continuity and discontinuity in space and time). Figure 2 shows the space-time diagram of the two phenomena that form our duality. For the wave the axis of continuity is spatial, for the object the axis of continuity is temporal. For the wave there are relations in space, for the object there are relations in time. A 90° rotation of the axis of continuity transforms spatial into temporal relations, which can be applied to self-organization in the following sense.
FIGURE 2.
The axis of continuity for a) a wave, and b) an object or particle.
In an unordered (chaotic) phase the dynamical structure is non-local -every point in space shows the same (infinite) dynamics. The sensitivity to small influences can be read as a strong relation between all points in space. Along the time axis there is only a very weak link between subsequent states of a point -we could talk of a lack of (local) determinism.
In an ordered phase we observe more or less autonomous structures. Relations between structures in space become less important and relations in time are dominant (local determinism, i.e. the temporal evolution of a spatial entity depends on the entity alone).
The metaphor of the rotating axis of continuity can be generalized to space-time structure. In a phase-transition a given space-time structure turns to time-space structure or vice versa.
Of course, there is not just one axis of continuity that fully characterizes the state of a process. On different levels of abstraction (or for what we may describe as different types of interaction) the axis of continuity may have different orientations. This is even a necessary condition for phenomena that are more interesting than wave and object. A useful concept of a system in our terms requires the coming together of wave and particle properties. Like the wave the system is related to its environment, like the particle the system shows a certain degree of autonomy and stability. The usual way of dealing with the two contradicting aspects can be described as a strict separation of levels of description. E.g., on the level of energy and matter exchange, an autopoietic system (1) is open to its environment, whereas on the level of its operation or organization the autopoietic system is regarded to be closed. For the radical constructivist, the consequence of this closed organization is that we are cognitive islands having no access to what´s going on outside. Our mental lives are regarded as mere self-products of cognitive systems. Interactions between a cognitive system and its environment (so-called perturbations) play only a role as provocations for the system to switch to a different self-determined state. In our terminology, this view can be characterized as a stress of the particle aspect of cognitive organization. The relation between the system and its environment is not addressed in a qualitative manner, there is an informational gap between system and environment, i.e. spatial discontinuity . Along the time axis there is continuity, the main goal of the system being its own survival, i.e. the maintenance of its organization. The lack of the wave aspect becomes visible when we talk of social systems.
In social sciences there is strong interest in constructivist approaches (10) , but the perception of the benefits of autopoiesis is paralleled by an increasing awareness of its drawbacks. The problem culminates in the question what should be taken as the (autopoietic) system. When starting from the assumption that the cognitive system, i.e. the individual, should be regarded as the primary entity, we loose grasp of the characteristics of the social entity. For us, it is highly unclear, how a cognitive system that is separated from its environment by an organizational closure should act as an integrative part of a social entity that is supposed to maintain an organization of its own. For a useful concept of a social entity it seems inescapable to postulate a much stronger relation between individuals than just recursive perturbations. The individual must represent the system whose part it is in order to justify the term social.
The alternative assumption, namely the treatment of social processes as autopoietic systems (e.g. Luhmann´s communication systems (11)), faces the problem that the individual can no longer be regarded as a constitutive entity of the system -the individual is placed in the environment and thus plays a subordinate role.
From our viewpoint there is no real problem, because there cannot be a right description. Both approaches, though incompatible with each other, can be accepted as useful, if only we see their fundamental incompleteness. The assumption of an operational closure on some level of abstraction is just a distinction that a) is a necessary condition for the formulation of a model, but b) makes structure on different levels of abstraction disappear.
Another important notion that has to be addressed in the context of self-organization is emergence. We would like to make a distinction between a weak and a strong meaning of emergence. The weak meaning, which is compatible with the reductionist picture, simply addresses the observation that a set of functionally describable parts, by interacting with each other, may produce some coherent collective behavior, at least in the eyes of an outside observer. The existence of this kind of emergent behavior does no harm to the functional behavior of the parts. In its strong meaning the status of emergent phenomena is different -they exert effects on the behavior of the parts that produce the behavior. For many scientific hardliners this second interpretation is pure mysticism (see, e.g. Searle's view of emergence (12)), whereas for the social scientist there is no problem to talk of a bidirectional influence between the level of the parts and the emergent level of collective behavior. A natural example for this inter-level relation is the relation between individual and society. Society is understood as emerging from interacting individuals and individuals are understood as formed by society. For an example from the harder side of science, think of Haken´s so-called synergetics (13) , where emergent order principles enslave the parts of a system.
What seems to be an unresolvable tension can be clarified on the basis of our assumptions. It is true that fully describable parts cannot be influenced by phenomena that emerge from their interactions, but there is something wrong with the assumption that there are fully describable and deterministic parts. If we accept the incompleteness of every description, the top-down causation becomes much less miraculous. Indeed, most of social science is far away from believing that individuals could in principle be fully described as functional parts. (It is yet another question where we believe the source of non-determinisms lies -for us, it stems from the fault inherent in any division and not from some inner property.)
THE COGNITIVE SCENARIO
In the introduction to the representation problem in section 2, we pointed out two aspects of the problem. The first one has to do with the spatial relation between a cognitive system and its environment, and the second one with the temporal relation between states of the cognitive system. From the viewpoint of space-time unity, these aspects can be identified with wave and particle aspects of a spatio-temporal whole that form a duality. It is impossible to make clear cuts, analyze the aspects separately and add them up again for a full understanding. Yet our distinctions allow the formulation of some elementary relations. Before we go into this, we have to introduce our cognitive scenario.
In Fig. 3 we illustrate the two intersecting spatio-temporal unities involved in our cognitive scenario. First, the cognitive system whose operational closure is stressed by radical constructivism, and second, the interaction game between (parts of) the cognitive system and (parts of) its environment, whose status as a dynamic unit has recently been underlined in (14) . Again, there is no problem for our approach, as both systems or unities are products of incomplete descriptions, or -to formulate it differently -a construction like ours requires an assumption that forbids complete descriptions of parts or subsystems. When allowing overlapping systems we are no longer bound to scenarios consisting of disjunct and isolated systems (Luhmann) or of strict hierarchies of systems (e.g. Maturana´s autopoietic units of different order). Unlike rather simple systems a cognitive system does not play the role of a definable entity for a meta-system. It is impossible to define a cognitive system because it is inseparably bound to an unlimited set of what we describe as overlapping systems, unities, organizations or whatever notions we use.
In our scenario the representation problem has to be formulated as follows:
In which way can one part, namely the cognitive system, both contain and produce phenomena of the whole system consisting of the cognitive system and its environment in interaction?
The general answer to this question is already given and only has to be repeated in this place: There is a duality between two aspects, the wave aspect being responsible for the containment of the (non-local) dynamics of the whole in each part, and the particle aspect being the pre-condition for treating the parts as entities that roughly can be defined in space, show some local causality and thus might be taken as producers of the system´s dynamics.
In the following we will use our distinctions for a more detailed analysis of the cognitive scenario.
FIGURE 3.
The cognitive scenario consisting of two intersecting systems: the cognitive system CS and the system formed by interacting parts of CS and its environment E.
THE ELEMENTS OF THE COGNITIVE SCENARIO
According to assumption (1), space and time are correlated in a specific way, which we can exploit for the (necessarily incomplete) extraction of some space-time elements involved in the cognitive scenario. Figure 4 shows how the spatially continuous signals S i between "object" and cognitive system correspond with the temporally discontinuous events E i in CS. On a higher level of abstraction, the spatially discontinuous object, which reacts to CS´s actions, corresponds with a continuous sequence of events in CS. The object, which for the outside observer is a mere spatial phenomenon, is accessible to the inside observer only by the internal temporal structure. The represented phenomenon, of course, is the spatio-temporal pattern of the interaction game between the cognitive system and its environment and not the object as such.
What is the difference between an object and a cognitive system? Does the object represent the interaction game between itself and the cognitive system in the same way as the cognitive system does? The fact that some temporal structure can be observed on some entity does not suffice for making a distinction between object and cognitive system. There is something in addition for a cognitive system. Holding a representation of something means for an inside observer to know about his or her own next states and to be able to force specific sequences by acting on the object. The requirement for this ability is that an additional rotation of spatio-temporal structure takes place in the cognitive system (which is not shown in Fig. 4 ): The temporal structure is mapped to a spatial structure within the cognitive system. This spatial structure becomes part of the whole system as the particle aspect of mental representations. It is this aspect that allows us to model cognition as computation of representations with some success.
FIGURE 4.
The interaction game between an "object" and a cognitive system. The spatial discontinuities on the side of the object correspond via the signals S i with temporal discontinuities on the side of the cognitive system (events E i ). The non-local structure of the whole system is mapped to the sequence of events in the cognitive system.
As an example, think of the concept of an obstacle, which -for an outside observer -is an entity in space. For the inside observer (i.e. a cognitive system interacting with the obstacle) the obstacle can in the first place only be a set of temporal links between states of the cognitive system, e.g. "when I try to walk through, it will hurt". This temporal relation is the representation of the interaction game of the whole system in one of its parts, namely in the cognitive system. It is the wave aspect of the mental representation of the obstacle, which makes up the meaning of the representation. On the other hand, we can only speak of a computable representation of the obstacle, when the cognitive system is able to transform the temporal rule (walk->hurt) into an entity in some internal representation space. As an internal spatial entity the representation "obstacle" shows stability in time (it is memorized) and can be used as the basis for calculations that guide the behavior of the cognitive system (e.g. avoid walking through obstacles).
When trying to reduce mental representations to one side of the duality we are trapped in contradiction. Regarding representations merely as the temporal structure in the cognitive system allows the cognitive system to contain phenomena of the whole system and therefore to carry meaning. Yet, when there is only the wave aspect representations loose their effect (15) -there is no influence of the representations on the cognitive processes. If we regard representations as purely spatial and syntactical structure, they can very well be understood as the causal basis for the cognitive processes, but can in no way carry meaning.
It is inconceivable to simply add wave and particle aspects in order to get a full picture. The two aspects stem from two interdependent modes of description of the one spatio-temporal whole and cannot be analyzed separately. As a consequence, attempts to solve the problem of mental representations under the paradigm of information processing are doomed to failure. Information only means something when being processed, information can therefore not be separated from processing.
CONCLUSION
In some sense, the representation problem itself represents and thus exhibits our duality. On one hand the representation is related to all the problems of cognitive science, from philosophical to technical ones. On the other hand a good account on the representation problem ought to be a building block for a cognitive theory. It follows from our argumentation that we cannot expect a solution of this kind. There cannot be a computable theory when concepts cannot be separated and defined. The fault inherent in any division can be neglected for simple, mechanical systems, but becomes obvious for complex, living systems.
We hope to have shown that this is not the end of the scientific study of cognition. The alternative we tried to point to is not anti-scientific, but takes science as an important source. If there is something wrong with science, it is the way we believe in it. The fact that cognition can be studied under the paradigm of information-processing does not at all imply that cognition is information-processing. This difference may be almost irrelevant for single disciplines, but has to be recognized for a qualitative inter-disciplinary discourse. It is even more essential to the most important of all applications of cognitive science, namely the question how we understand ourselves.
